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“Once the quantity theory regained academic
respectability, it was obliged to resume respon-
sibility for the short-run forecasting of aggre-
gate movements of prices and quantities 
This it has begun to do, most importantly
through the research work of the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, and with appreciable
success; but it has been lured into playing in a
new ballpark, and playing according to a differ-
ent set of rules than it initially established for
itself  [I]ts own success is likely to be transi-
tory, precisely because it has relied on the same
mechanisms of intellectual conquest as the
[Keynesian] revolution itself  and has also
espoused a methodology that has put it in con-
flict with long-run trends in the development of
the subject.”—Harry Johnson (1971, pp. 12-13)
M
acroeconomists today generally agree that
monetary policy cannot permanently
increase the rate of economic growth
above its potential or decrease the rate of unem-
ployment below its market clearing, or “natural,”
level (e.g., De Long, 2000; Woodford, forthcoming).
In the long run, monetary policy affects only the
rate of inflation, and many economists argue that
monetary policy can best promote maximum sus-
tainable economic growth by ensuring price level
stability (e.g., Barro, 1996). Monetary policymak-
ing, however, both in the United States and else-
where, is often concerned with the short-run.
Policymakers meet frequently: the Federal
Reserve’s Open Market Committee (FOMC) meets
eight times a year, for example, and a vote is taken
at each meeting on whether to maintain or change
the current stance of policy. While price stability is
widely acknowledged as the appropriate long-run
objective of monetary policy, many economists
argue that policymakers should respond to fluctu-
ations in real output or employment as part of
their strategy to achieve price stability and, ulti-
mately, to support maximum sustainable econom-
ic growth.1
To help guide them in their deliberations,
policymakers and their economic advisors rely on
both complex economic and econometric models
and on simple rules-of-thumb based on empirical
regularities observed in macroeconomic data.
Indeed, simple rules, such as the so-called Taylor
rule (Taylor, 1993), which describes the response of
the federal funds rate to past deviations of inflation
and output from target values, often appear
to explain well how policymakers set policy in the
short-run. Economists generally conclude that
rules-based policies are preferable to those relying
solely on the discretion of policymakers. The trans-
parency of rules reduces uncertainty about the
responsiveness of policy to economic change and
can enhance the accountability of policymakers.
Monetarists have long advocated the use of
rules to guide monetary policy, with Friedman’s
(1960) proposal for a constant money stock
growth rate being the most famous example. At
the time it was made, Friedman’s proposal was
sharply at odds with the prevailing mainstream
view that monetary policy was best conducted by
manipulating interest rates to strike a balance
between inflation and unemployment. At the time,
economists widely believed in the power of
activist monetary and, especially, fiscal policy to
limit fluctuations in economic activity and to
ensure sufficient demand to provide full employ-
ment economic growth over extended periods.
Friedman’s “monetarist” policy rule thus attracted
considerable attention. Moreover, a growing body
of empirical work by Friedman and others show-
ing the potential for money supply shocks to have
large short-run impacts on output and employ-
1
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ment led to the development of an alternative
framework for conducting stabilization policy
based on targeting growth of the money stock. 
The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis played
an important and highly visible role in the devel-
opment and advocacy of stabilization policy based
on the targeting of monetary aggregates. This arti-
cle examines the development of the monetarist-
based stabilization policy framework advocated by
the St. Louis Bank between the late 1960s and the
1980s, with an eye toward identifying lessons
from that experience for the conduct of stabiliza-
tion policy in general.2
This article also illustrates how the Federal
Reserve System’s decentralized structure fosters a
climate of internal debate. Beginning in the 1960s,
the monetary policy actions advocated by the St.
Louis Bank in its research publications, in public
forums, and in the participation of the Bank’s
presidents in policy meetings often were sharply
at odds with the policies adopted by the Federal
Reserve System. The Fed’s decentralized structure
permitted the development of alternative policy
views and the exploration of new ideas within the
System (Wheelock, 2000). Policy debates often
took place within System publications. We
describe the public debate as we trace the evolu-
tion of the St. Louis Fed’s monetarist policy, and
the criticism of that policy by other Fed officials,
in the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review,
other System publications, and in the public
speeches of Darryl Francis, President of the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of St. Louis from 1966 to 1976.
To provide a backdrop to our discussion, the
next section summarizes the dominant policy
positions taken by economists during the 1960s
and early 1970s about the causes of inflation and
the role of monetary policy. We point out key
issues where monetarists disagreed with the con-
ventional wisdom. In the subsequent two sections
we review the research and policy positions taken
by St. Louis Fed economists and officials from the
1960s through the early 1980s. We limit our dis-
cussion mainly to the period 1968-86. In 1968,
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis published an
econometric analysis of the relative impacts of
monetary and fiscal policy on economic activity.
That article, by Andersen and Jordan (1968),
became one of the most cited papers in econom-
ics in the past 40 years. In 1970, the Bank pub-
lished the first version of its monetarist model for
gauging the impact of monetary policy actions on
economic activity (Andersen and Carlson, 1970).
The year 1986 marked the appearance of the final
version of that model (Carlson, 1986). We show
how research conducted at the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis extended earlier monetarist
analysis that had focused on the role of money in
explaining economic activity in the long run.
Their success in finding apparently robust, stable
relationships in both long- and short-run data led
monetarists to apply long-run propositions to
short-run policy questions, effectively competing
with alternative views of the time. When the
short-run correlation between money and eco-
nomic activity went astray in the early 1980s,
however, the efficacy of the monetarist rule and
appeals for targeting monetary aggregates to
achieve economic stabilization quickly lost credi-
bility. 
THE SETTING: FINE-TUNING THE
ECONOMY
The 1960s were the glory days of activist,
short-run stabilization policy. Policymakers had
confidence in their ability to achieve full employ-
ment using fiscal and monetary policy to “fine
tune” or manage aggregate demand. For a time,
their confidence seemed justified: Before the pres-
ent expansion, the 1960s witnessed the longest
uninterrupted expansion in U.S. history, with the
economy operating at full employment (defined
then as a civilian unemployment rate of 4 percent
or less) from 1966 to 1969. 
Beginning in 1965, however, rising inflation
and an increasing balance of payments deficit
reflected the cost of expansionary macroeconom-
ic policies. Policymakers felt increasing pressure
to control inflation but were hesitant to take
actions that might reduce employment and real
output growth. Because policymaking was viewed
as striking a balance between inflation and unem-
ployment, disagreements about policy, according
to one Fed governor, boiled down to one’s prefer-
ences between the two outcomes.3 Because un-
employment frequently was viewed as a more
2
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serious concern than inflation, for many years the
Fed opted for maintaining an inflationary bias in
monetary policy to avoid higher rates of unem-
ployment. Fed officials, like other government
officials, argued that the inflation-unemployment
tradeoff could be improved only through the coop-
eration of business and labor in the setting of
prices and wages or, if necessary, by the use of
anti-trust and other polices to make price setting
more competitive. Alternatively, inflation could be
controlled through explicit regulation of wages and
prices
Juxtaposed against this mainstream view was
an alternative associated with the work of Milton
Friedman, Anna Schwartz, Karl Brunner, Allan
Meltzer, and other so-called monetarists. Monetar-
ism was rooted in the Quantity Theory of Money.
The core of the Quantity Theory is that, in the long
run, inflation reflects excessive growth of the
money stock relative to real output growth, the lat-
ter determined fundamentally by non-monetary
forces such as population growth and productivity.
An important component of this position is the sta-
bility of the public’s demand for money.
Monetarists amassed empirical evidence showing
the demand for money to be more stable than
money supply or, equivalently, that velocity is sta-
ble.4 Stability of velocity supported monetarists’
view that short-run fluctuations in economic activ-
ity often are caused by fluctuations in money sup-
ply growth—fluctuations brought about by central
bank policy actions.5 Monetarists concluded that
central bank attempts to manipulate interest rates
had led to destabilizing fluctuations in money sup-
ply growth and, therefore, in economic activity.
Hence, monetarists argued that monetary policy-
makers should minimize the variation of the
growth rate of the money stock both in the short-
run and over time. Lags in assessing economic
conditions and in the effects of policy actions on
economic activity, they argued, made attempts at
“fine tuning” a balance between inflation and
unemployment futile. Instead, monetarists argued
for a policy that maintained growth of the money
stock at a low, fixed rate, irrespective of the busi-
ness cycle.
The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis was the
center of monetarism within the Federal Reserve
System from the 1960s into the 1980s.6 Darryl
Francis, who became president of the St. Louis
Bank in 1966, was an especially strong advocate
of monetarist policy prescriptions. At FOMC
meetings, he argued frequently for a policy of
minimizing variability in money stock growth
around a moderate trend. In public forums,
Francis made the case that growth of the money
stock was the most accurate reflection of monetary
policy and that excessive monetary growth was
the fundamental cause of inflation. Francis was
supported in his policy views by St. Louis Fed
economists, whose research findings were largely
in accord with those of other monetarists but
sharply at odds with the conventional wisdom of
the times, including the views about monetary
policy held in most quarters of the Federal
Reserve System.
Mainstream Views About Monetary
Policy in the 1960s
A review of monetarism and all of its differ-
ences with mainstream Keynesian macroeconom-
ics of the 1960s is beyond the scope of this article.
Sharp theoretical differences about the cause or
causes of inflation and economic fluctuations, as
well as methodological differences about the
empirical analysis of the effects of policy actions
on economic activity, however, are fundamental to
understanding why St. Louis Fed research and poli-
cy positions were controversial. These differences
include whether a tradeoff exists between inflation
and unemployment, either in the short or the long
run, and whether such a tradeoff is exploitable by
policymakers. A related question is whether mone-
tary policy can, or should, be used to fight inflation
when the economy is at less-than-full employ-
ment. Monetarists and non-monetarists divided
also over the measures that best reflect the impact
of monetary policy actions—monetary aggregates
or interest rates and credit aggregates. Finally,
monetarists and non-monetarists debated the tools
and methods for identifying the impact of mone-
tary policy on the economy.
4
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Inflation and the Phillips Curve
The Phillips curve—the inverse relationship
between unemployment and wage growth in
British historical data observed by Phillips
(1958)—was a key empirical regularity at the heart
of macroeconomic policy discussions in the
1960s. The Phillips curve was viewed as a con-
straint on stabilization policy; policymakers with
both unemployment and inflation goals had to
choose a feasible combination of the two because
policies that, say, reduced inflation would invari-
ably slow economic activity and increase unem-
ployment. Perry (1966, p. 3) noted that
a fairly general consensus exists among econ-
omists  [that s]uccessively higher levels of
activity are associated, roughly at least, with
correspondingly larger rates of price increase.
In this situation, the more traditional problem
of adjusting aggregate demand so as to reach
full employment without overshooting into
the area of inflation must be replaced with the
dual problems of deciding what combination
of unemployment and inflation to aim at and
then adjusting aggregate demand to reach this
point.
Fed governor Sherman Maisel (1973, p. 14)
observed succinctly: “There is a trade-off between
idle men and a more stable value for the dollar.
A conscious decision must be made as to how
much unemployment and loss of output is accept-
able in order to get smaller price rises.”
Although many influential economists
believed that the hyperbolic shape and negative
slope of the Phillips curve were fixed, it was clear
that the position of the Phillips curve could move
over time. The U.S. experience of 1955-58 was
widely discussed: In 1955-57, the unemployment
rate hardly changed when the inflation rate
increased sharply; in 1958, when inflation abated,
the increase in the unemployment rate seemed
disproportionately high. Concern arose that the
U.S. economy had an “inflation bias,” meaning
that inflation, perhaps accelerating inflation, was
necessary to achieve and maintain full employ-
ment (Wheelock, 1998).
The experience of 1955-58 gave prominence
to the notions of “cost-push” inflation and “wage-
price spirals.” The term cost-push inflation was
used to define an ongoing increase in the general
level of prices caused by firms passing along
increases in production costs, in contrast to
“demand-pull” inflation caused by increases in
aggregate demand. Cost-push forces were thought
to explain how inflation could occur at less than
full employment. The “essence of the problem,”
according to Samuelson and Solow (1960, p. 181),
stems from the absence of perfect competition in
factor and product markets and was, Bronfen-
brenner and Holzman (1963) noted, associated
with the power of “economic pressure groups,”
such as labor unions and monopolistic firms.
If a powerful union extracts a real wage increase,
the quantity of labor demanded falls. If affected
firms have pricing power, they pass along a por-
tion of the increase in wages to consumers in the
form of higher prices. If perfect competition exists
in other industries and labor markets, prices and
wages fall to offset the increases in the first indus-
try. If wages are downwardly rigid throughout the
economy, however, the aggregate price level might
rise alongside an increase in unemployment.
Throughout the 1960s, the Economic Report of
the President blamed inflation on “excessive” wage
and price increases. The clear implication was that
monetary and fiscal policies were not responsible
for inflation when the economy was at less than
full employment. The Economic Report for 1965
explained that “in a world where large firms and
large unions play an essential role, the cost-price
record will depend heavily upon the responsibility
with which they exercise the market power that
society entrusts to them” (1966, p. 179). Hence,
President Johnson urged, “in the strongest terms I
know—that unions and business firms exercise
the most rigorous restraint in their wage and price
determinations” (Economic Report of the President
for 1967, p. 20). Throughout the 1960s the
Economic Report published detailed wage and
price “guideposts” defining the extent to which
wage and price increases were “justifiable.”
Monetarists dismissed the notion of cost-push
inflation, arguing that inflation is “always and
everywhere a monetary phenomenon.” Non-
monetarists generally accepted that “cost-push
may involve increases in money supply, money
income, and money expenditures, particularly if
decreases in output and employment are to be
avoided” (Bronfenbrenner and Holzman, 1963, 
p. 614). Nonetheless, many economists found
monetary explanations of inflation wanting,
claiming that inflation can arise through wage and
price setting independent of shocks to aggregateFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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demand. The short-run linkages from money to
inflation were considered to be tenuous at best.7
Economists generally did acknowledge the
potential for restrictive monetary policy to elimi-
nate cost-induced inflation. The apparent down-
ward rigidity of prices and wages, however, con-
vinced many that using monetary policy to arrest
even a moderate inflation would entail a substan-
tial and unacceptable increase in unemployment.
The Economic Report of the President for 1961 
(p. 47) claimed that “an attempt to restrict aggre-
gate demand so severely as to eliminate all risk of
an increase in the general price level might well
involve keeping the economy far below full em-
ployment.”8 High unemployment was simply an
unacceptable cost of reducing inflation. In his
introduction to the 1967 Report (p. 20), President
Johnson argued, “Dealing with inflation by creat-
ing a recession or persistent slack is succumbing
to the disease—not curing it. The experience of
1957 and 1958—when the unemployment rate
reached 7 
1
2 percent and consumer prices still rose
5 percent—is a clear reminder of the large costs of
such a policy and of its limited effectiveness in
halting a spiral in motion. This is a course which I
reject.”
To fight inflation, some mainstream econo-
mists advocated incomes policies; others favored
policies aimed at enhancing the competitiveness
of product and labor markets and policies aimed
at raising productivity. Monetary policy, many
argued, should focus on maintaining full employ-
ment by keeping interest rates low.
Many Federal Reserve officials expressed simi-
lar qualms about using monetary policy to control
inflation. For example, Charles Partee, a Fed staff
economist who later became a Fed governor,
argued in 1970 that “The question is whether
monetary policy could or should do anything to
combat a persistent residual rate of inflation 
The answer, I think, is negative.” He added that
“Product markets generally are substantially
underutilized and labor appears to be readily
available  It seems to me that we should regard
continuing increases [in the price level] as a struc-
tural problem not amenable to macro-economic
measures” (FOMC Minutes, April 1970, pp. 385-86,
379, 396 [quoted in Mayer (1999), p. 99]). Federal
Reserve Board Chairman Arthur Burns also argued
that “Monetary policy could do very little to arrest
an inflation that rested so heavily on wage-cost
pressures . . . A much higher rate of unemploy-
ment produced by monetary policy would not
moderate such pressures appreciably” (FOMC
Minutes, June 8, 1971, p. 51). 
The Long-Run Phillips Curve
Wage and price rigidity and the possibility of
cost-induced inflation suggested to many
observers that using monetary policy to contain
inflation would invariably cause higher unemploy-
ment. Monetarists did not deny this, but argued
that the tightening of monetary policy would have
merely a temporary adverse impact on unemploy-
ment. Andersen (1973), for example, argued that
“our economic system is such that disturbing
forces, including even changes in money growth,
are rather rapidly absorbed and  output will
naturally revert to its long-run growth path follow-
ing a disturbance” (p. 7).
Some economists, however, argued that using
monetary or fiscal policy to achieve price stability
might cause unemployment to increase perma-
nently. Keynesians frequently interpreted the
Great Depression as indicating that private
demand might be insufficient to generate full
employment output in the face of downwardly
rigid wages and prices, thereby leaving the econo-
my mired permanently at less than full employ-
ment. Thus, many economists believed that 
monetary and fiscal policy should ensure that
aggregate demand is sufficient to generate full
employment, even if that requires some inflation.
Samuelson (1960, p. 265), for example, argued
that “With important cost-push forces assumed to
be operating, there are many models in which it
can be shown that some sacrifice in the require-
ment for price stability is needed if short- and
long-term growth are to be maximized, if average
long-run unemployment is to be minimized, if
optimal allocation of resources as between differ-
ent occupations is to be facilitated.” 
The Fed often was accused of paying “exces-
sive” attention to price stability. In summarizing a
symposium on recent monetary policy, Harris
(1960, p. 245) wrote, “In general the disagree-
7
Ackley (in Perlman, 1965, p. 47), for example, wrote that “I do not
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ments of [participating] economists with Federal
Reserve policy have stemmed primarily from a
fear that the interest in the stability of the currency
has been at the expense of growth and employ-
ment.”9 Not only was the tradeoff between infla-
tion and unemployment widely viewed as persist-
ent, but some economists argued that policies to
achieve price stability in the short-run might make
the tradeoff less favorable over time. Samuelson
and Solow (1960), for example, believed that poli-
cies directed at limiting inflation in the short-run
might increase structural unemployment. The
long-run tradeoff between inflation and unem-
ployment would worsen because an increase in
structural unemployment would raise the size of
the increase in inflation that would be needed to
achieve a given reduction in the unemployment
rate. Perry (1966, p. 119) even suggested that poli-
cies aimed at maintaining low unemployment and
minimizing short-run cyclical variation in output
could moderate wage and price increases.10
The Impact of Monetary Policy
Economists’ conviction that policymakers
could manipulate aggregate demand to stabilize
the growth of real output reached its zenith in the
1960s and early 1970s. The apparent failure of
low interest rates to revive the economy during
the Great Depression, however, was taken as evi-
dence that monetary policy is less potent than fis-
cal policy. The 1950s witnessed the development
of new theories about the impact of monetary pol-
icy, with the dominant view being that policy is
effective through its influence on both the cost
and availability of credit.11 Still, even in the 1960s,
the mainstream view was that monetary policy,
though capable of having some impact, was less
powerful than fiscal policy.12
Monetarists, by contrast, argued that changes
in the quantity of money exert a powerful influ-
ence on economic activity. Friedman’s work dur-
ing the 1950s helped establish the foundation for
later studies of the link between monetary policy
and the economy (e.g., Friedman, 1956). His
examination of monetary policy and the business
cycle is reflected in his testimony to the Joint
Economic Committee in March 1958.13 At that
time, most Fed officials believed that short-term
interest rates and the quantity of bank credit were
the appropriate instruments of monetary policy.
Minutes of FOMC meetings reveal that policymak-
ers generally rejected the notion that movements
in the money supply affect economic activity,
much less that the Fed can control the money
stock. Although one or two FOMC members
warned persistently that fluctuations in money
growth could cause undue fluctuations in the real
economy, these concerns largely were ignored.14
Outside the Fed, by contrast, monetarist views
about the impact of fluctuations in money stock
growth were receiving considerable attention.
Friedman and Meiselman’s (1963) “The Relative
Stability of Monetary Velocity and the Investment
Multiplier in the United States, 1897-1958,” for
example, stirred much debate. Associated with the
Commission on Money and Credit’s inquiry into
the structure of the financial system, this paper
was controversial because it rejected a core ingre-
dient in the Keynesian theoretical structure—the
validity of the expenditure multiplier. Friedman
9 Angell (1960, p. 248) argued similarly, stating that “As to aggregate
growth, a good many students feel—as do I —not only that mone-
tary policy has not done much to promote it, but that the intermit-
tent restrictions imposed to fight instability and inflation have
probably retarded it substantially.” Hansen (1960, pp. 255-56) pro-
posed that “Monetary policy should seek to achieve a low long-run
rate of interest” to raise permanently the ratio of investment to out-
put and thus real growth, while fiscal policy could “offset  the
inflationary pressures caused by the increase in investment inci-
dent to rapid technological advance and low interest rates.”
10 Policymakers often agreed with such assessments. The Economic
Report of the President for 1965 concluded “Rising prices that
originate from such a [cost-push] process can affect expectations,
jeopardize the stability and balance of an expansion, and create
inequities and distortions just as readily as demand inflation. But
measures to restrain these price increases by reducing over-all
demand will enlarge unemployment and impair the productivity
record so important to cost-price stability over the longer run” (p.
179). The Council of Economic Advisors at this time consisted of
Gardner Ackley, Otto Eckstein, and Arthur Okun.
11 The “Availability Doctrine” posits that small changes in interest
rates can have large economic effects by affecting banks’ willing-
ness to supply loans. The theory was developed by New York Fed
economist Robert Roosa (1956) and was the dominant view of the
transmission mechanism within the Fed at the time. See Johnson
(1962) for a survey of current thinking on monetary theory and
policy effectiveness as of the early 1960s.
12 The consensus view is perhaps well represented by Ando et al.
(1963, p. 2), who concluded “the effect of monetary policy on the
flow of expenditures is far from overwhelming, though it exists and
is of a magnitude worth exploiting in the interests of economic
stability  Our findings on fiscal policy are primarily that varia-
tions in disposable income, either through transfer payments or
personal income tax changes, can operate as a powerful short-run
stabilizer.”
13 This testimony was based on on-going research with Anna J.
Schwartz at the National Bureau of Economic Research. This
research was subsequently published in three volumes: see
Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 1970, 1982). 
14 In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Malcolm Bryan, President of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, argued that the Fed should target
the growth rate of total reserves, and minimize fluctuations in the
money stock. See Meigs (1976) and Hafer (1999).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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and Meiselman’s empirical analysis also found
money demand to be relatively more stable than
money supply, suggesting that observed move-
ments in the money stock and economic activity
are dominated by Fed policy actions rather than
by volatility in the public’s demand for money. 
The debate that ensued was so important that
the American Economic Review devoted an entire
issue to critical appraisals of the Friedman-
Meiselman (1963) study by Ando and Modigliani
(1965) and DePrano and Mayer (1965) and a
response by Friedman and Meiselman (1965).15
Two issues were key to the attacks and rejoinder.
One was Friedman and Meiselman’s finding that
velocity is relatively more stable than the
Keynesian expenditure multiplier. In other words,
output appeared to be related more to movements
in money than to other measures of autonomous
expenditure.
The other issue, one that is more important for
what would later be the attack on the St. Louis
approach, was the procedure Friedman and
Meiselman used to produce that finding. The
debate displayed a fundamental difference in
views about how to estimate economic relation-
ships for policy purposes. Friedman and
Meiselman, whose work was grounded in the tra-
dition of the Quantity Theory of Money, based
their conclusions on simple reduced-form rela-
tions observed in the data. Ando and Modigliani
(1965) argued that such simple regressions, not
much more than correlations, were inferior to the
output of the large-scale, structural models then
coming into vogue to evaluate policy. In other
words, though different approaches may produce
different results, only the most sophisticated is
useful for policy analysis.16
Many Federal Reserve officials embraced the
use of large-scale econometric models then being
developed. Board staff participated with econo-
mists from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology in constructing the FRB-MIT model,
which was used for policy analysis and evaluation
at the Board. Such models were widely judged
superior to single-equation or small-model sys-
tems for studying the effects of policy actions on
economic activity. An official of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York argued that large-scale
models produced “quantitative estimates of the
timing and magnitude of the effects of central
bank actions on the money supply and other
financial magnitudes and the subsequent effects,
in turn, of these variables on each of the various
major components of aggregate demand” (Davis,
1968, p. 73). Thus, large structural models
appeared to give policymakers the information
they needed to make short-term, fine-tuning poli-
cy adjustments to stabilize economic activity.
Monetary Policy Target
Alongside large-scale macroeconometric mod-
els, the 1960s witnessed the development of
increasingly complex analyses of the effects of
monetary policy actions, interacting with financial
regulatory policies, on financial flows and interest
rates. With the exception of monetarists, many
macroeconomists believed that monetary policy
was not represented accurately by the behavior of
any single variable, such as the rate of interest, the
quantity of bank credit, or the stock of money.
This view was reflected in the Economic Report of
the President for 1968:
In the formulation of monetary policy,
careful attention should be paid to inter-
est rates and credit availability as influ-
enced by and associated with the flows of
deposits and credit to different types of
financial institutions and spending units.
Among the financial flows generally con-
sidered to be relevant are: the total of
funds raised by nonfinancial sectors of
the economy, the credit supplied by com-
mercial banks, the net amount of new
mortgage credit, the net changes in the
public’s holdings of liquid assets, changes
in time deposits at banks and other thrift
institutions, and changes in the money
supply. Some consideration should be
given to all of these financial flows as
well as to related interest rates in formu-
lating any comprehensive policy program
or analysis of financial conditions. (p. 89)
The Report also dismissed monetarist appeals
for focusing on money stock growth. In response
to calls for setting monetary policy according to a
15 This is the so-called AM-FM or “radio” debate. Hester (1964) was
also critical of the Friedman-Meiselman approach.
16 Brunner (1986) provides an excellent and wide-ranging overview of
this debate. He defends the Friedman-Meiselman (1963) approach,
arguing that “the use of a single equation with a single independent
variable should now be clear. It was the appropriate choice for an
assessment of the core class [of hypotheses]. It did not represent a
single equation model or a [direct] disposition to favor simple, as
against sophistical models” (p. 41, emphasis in original). Rather,
Brunner suggests (p. 40) that “the strong assertions conveyed by
the basic core of the income-expenditure approach, which fre-
quently spilled over into categorical policy statements, were thus
shown to have little substantive foundation.”8 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2001
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fixed-growth rule for the money stock, the Report
argued (p. 92) that “given the complex role of
interest rates in affecting various demand cate-
gories and the likely variations in so many other
factors, any such simple policy guide could prove
to be quite unreliable.” Similar reasoning was
reflected in the analysis of Federal Reserve Board
economists. In a paper published in the Federal
Reserve Bulletin, Gramley and Chase (1965, pp.
1403-04) wrote that “the money stock [is] an
untrustworthy indicator of the effects of policy
actions on financial asset prices and yields 
Financial market behavior is too complex for sim-
ple monetary rules to work.”17
Monetarists, of course, disagreed that the com-
plexity of financial markets made targeting a
monetary aggregate infeasible. In an article in the
Journal of Political Economy, Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis economist Leonall Andersen (1968)
presented evidence that the Fed could use open
market operations to smooth fluctuations in total
and free (i.e., excess less borrowed) reserves and,
by implication, in the monetary base.18 Albert
Burger (1971), another St. Louis Fed economist,
presented a detailed analysis of how the monetary
base can be manipulated so as to control the
money stock.
The Fed’s ability to control monetary aggre-
gates and the efficacy of monetary control for eco-
nomic stabilization remained hotly debated issues.
They also were central research themes at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis throughout the
1960s and 1970s.
ST. LOUIS—THE LONG-RUN VIEW
Under the leadership of its director of
research, Homer Jones, the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis emerged as the center of monetarist
economics within the Federal Reserve System in
the early 1960s.19 The Bank’s Review, which then
appeared monthly, tracked the behavior of the
economy and the money stock in nearly every
issue. Review articles often described the recent
behavior of the money stock and related it to
monetary growth during previous expansions. For
example, the June 1962 article, “Monetary
Developments,” compared graphically the recent
behavior of bank reserves and the money stock
(M1) with their patterns during the 1953-57 and
1957-60 cycles. This type of chart, used by
Friedman in his 1958 Senate testimony and in
Friedman and Schwartz (1963), provided a visual
analysis of expansionary and contractionary
movements of the money stock.
A companion article in the June 1962 Review
provided one of the first monetarist explanations
from the St. Louis Fed of how monetary policy
actions are transmitted to changes in nominal
income and prices. The article, “Changes in the
Velocity of Money: 1951-1962,” addressed one of
the more difficult questions monetarists faced in
attempting to use the Quantity Theory to explain
how monetary policy affects the economy in the
short-run. If velocity is highly variable, then the
connection between changes in the money supply
and nominal income is uncertain at best. The arti-
cle provided a “tentative and exploratory analysis”
of the behavior of velocity. The analysis showed
that a “rapid change in money [is] to be matched
temporarily by an opposite change in velocity”
(p. 13). Over time, however, “as the public recog-
nized the change in its [money] balances  there
was an increase in spending, and velocity moved
upward” (p. 13). Using this pattern to explain the
effects of past policies, the article noted that
“Within a few months after money began expand-
ing at a rapid rate in 1954, 1958, and 1961,
spending and the velocity of money began rising”
(p. 13).
The article is an early example of the research
coming out of St. Louis in support of the mone-
tarist position that changes in nominal income
largely reflect prior movements in the money sup-
ply. Even though velocity might vary, its variability
appeared to be less than that of money supply.
Hence, monetarists argued, observed cycles in
17 It was a long-standing view among Board officials that monetary
policy should not focus on any one variable. For example, as early
as 1932, Governor Eugene Meyer stated: “Our credit machinery is
entirely too delicate and responsive to too many influences to make
it desirable to have any one indicator, whether it be the price level
or the level of member bank reserves, be the sole guide in determin-
ing credit policy” (quoted by A. James Meigs in a letter to Milton
Friedman: Friedman Papers, Hoover Library, Stanford University,
Box 30, Folder 17).
18 See also Meigs (1966), who reviews the debate about whether finan-
cial innovation had made control of the money stock infeasible or
inefficacious. 
19 Jones was hired by the St. Louis Fed in 1958. At that time, the Bank’s
research staff consisted of one Ph.D. economist, two graduate stu-
dents, an agricultural economist, a geographer and several junior
staff members. During 1958, Jones corresponded regularly with
Friedman concerning potential hires for the department (Friedman
Papers, Hoover Library, Stanford University, Box 28, Folder 36). In
recognition of Jones’ accomplishments, in 1976 a special issue of
the Journal of Monetary Economics was devoted to papers in his
honor.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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nominal income growth are caused mainly by
changes in the money supply—over which the
Fed has some control—rather than by changes in
velocity.
As inflation worsened over the 1960s, Review
articles reflected an increasingly aggressive appli-
cation of monetarist arguments by St. Louis Fed
economists, as critical reviews of policy replaced
tentative and exploratory studies. For example, a
July 1966 article, titled “Total Demand and
Inflation,” stated that “Excessively stimulative
Government policies lead to marked increases in
the price level. Rapid monetary expansion is
regarded by many as a means of stimulating total
demand” (p. 1). In the same issue, Keran (1966)
studied the relationship between nominal and real
output in eight countries. He concluded that infla-
tion results when total demand—nominal
income—rises faster than the economy’s potential
rate of real output growth, suggesting that “If the
recent acceleration in total demand is continued
at a time of high-level resource utilization, prices
will probably begin to rise even faster” (p. 12). In
addition, Keran hinted at the possibility of using
monetary policy for short-run stabilization, noting
that “To the extent that policy tools control the
growth in total demand they are useful in achiev-
ing cyclical stability in the economy because year-
to-year movements in real output can be influenced
by changes in total demand” (p. 12, emphasis
added). These and other Review articles, many of
which were written anonymously, reflect clearly
the monetarist-oriented research and policy analy-
sis carried out by St. Louis Fed economists in the
early-to-mid 1960s. 
The St. Louis Bank’s visibility increased signifi-
cantly, however, with the publication of articles by
Andersen and Jordan (1968) and by Andersen and
Carlson (1970). These articles provided two of
monetarism’s most challenging attacks on policy
orthodoxy and mainstream Keynesian macroeco-
nomics. The former presented an econometric
evaluation of the relative impacts of monetary and
fiscal policy on economic activity. The latter
offered a small monetarist econometric model
that the authors proposed as an alternative tool to
simulate alternative policy scenarios. Both papers
concluded that changes in the growth of nominal
income and inflation are linked closely to changes
in the growth rates of monetary aggregates.
Although such relationships had been demonstrat-
ed over relatively long time-horizons, these two 
articles suggested that they hold over even the
short time horizons of concern to policymakers.
The articles were instrumental in developing the
monetarist policy rule as an alternative to the con-
ventional interest rate and fiscal-policy oriented
ideas of the time.
The Andersen-Jordan Equation
Andersen-Jordan (1968) (hereafter, AJ) is an
intellectual and analytical descendant of
Friedman-Meiselman (1963).20 Andersen and
Jordan, like Friedman and Meiselman, were inter-
ested in isolating statistically the impact of money
on nominal income. AJ went further, however.
They provided a straightforward empirical test of
a related and critical policy issue—the relative
impacts of monetary and fiscal impulses on nomi-
nal income. Rather than building a complex
econometric model like those in vogue at the
time, AJ took a relatively simple approach to
assessing alternative policies. They estimated a
single empirical relation—a “reduced-form”
model—between income and different measures
of monetary and fiscal policy actions. Their equa-
tion can be written as:
(1)
where Y represents nominal gross national prod-
uct, M is the money stock (M1 or the monetary
base), and E is a measure of fiscal policy actions.
The variables were measured as changes in their
levels. In their estimation, AJ accounted for lags in
the effect of policy actions on economic activity
using a new econometric technique that con-
strained the estimated parameters to lie along a
predetermined polynomial. This was thought to
provide more precise estimation of the effects of
changes in the policy variables.21













20 Jordan (1986) refers to it as a “sequel” to Friedman-Meiselman
(1963), though it clearly is linked to earlier work by Karl Brunner.
This is evident in the statement by AJ that their purpose is not to
“test rival economic theories [i.e., Keynesian vs. Monetarist] of the
mechanism by which monetary and fiscal actions influence eco-
nomic activity” (AJ, 1986, p. 29). A decade earlier Brunner was
examining the logical structure of empirically testing between
Keynesian models, in which money played a very minor role, and
monetary models, in which “money matters.” For example,
Brunner and Balbach (1959) present a structure of models in which
they test empirically the relative roles of money and fiscal policy
actions.
21 See Batten and Thornton (1986) and the articles cited therein for a
discussion of this and other technical issues regarding the estima-
tion of equation (1).10 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2001
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Using quarterly data covering the period 1952
to mid-1968, AJ estimated equation (1) to test
three hypotheses. By comparing the sizes of the
estimated impacts of fiscal and monetary policy
on GNP, AJ rejected the hypothesis that output
responds more to fiscal policy actions than to
changes in the money stock. Comparison of the
statistical significance of the coefficient estimates
for monetary and fiscal policy actions led AJ to
reject the hypothesis that fiscal actions have a
more “reliable” impact on GNP than monetary
actions. Finally, comparison of coefficient esti-
mates on lagged monetary and fiscal policy
actions, led AJ to reject the hypothesis that fiscal
actions affect GNP faster than do monetary policy
actions. They succinctly summed up their evi-
dence: “The response of economic activity to
monetary actions compared with that of fiscal
actions is (I) larger, (II) more predictable, and (III)
faster” (p. 22).
Early Criticism of Andersen-Jordan
(1968)
Andersen-Jordan (1968) was subject to imme-
diate and critical analysis by economists inside
and outside of the Federal Reserve System.
Technical criticisms have been dealt with at length
elsewhere.22 Of interest here is the fact that much
of the early debate over the usefulness and the
conclusions of the article took place among Fed
economists within the pages of System publica-
tions. For example, the first published criticism of
the AJ approach and findings was by DeLeeuw
and Kalchbrenner (1969), both of whom were or
had been with the Board of Governors.23 Their
comment was published in the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis Review, along with a response by
AJ. DeLeeuw and Kalchbrenner (hereafter, DK)
raised several technical issues, but focused on AJ’s
use of the monetary base as the appropriate
measure of monetary policy. DK argued that the
Fed controls neither the borrowed reserves of
member banks nor the currency stock. Hence,
they argued, the base is not statistically independ-
ent of the model’s dependent variable—changes
in GNP. DK reestimated the AJ equation, using the
base less borrowed reserves and currency as the
monetary policy variable, and found that,
although monetary policy appeared “to exert a
powerful influence” on GNP, money was not as
dominant as AJ’s results had suggested. DK noted
also that their results were more consistent with
the output from large-scale econometric models,
suggesting that their results were more plausible
than those of AJ.
Another early criticism of AJ appeared in the
Monthly Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York (Davis, 1969). That study defended the
view that monetary policy affects income through
interest rates, not the money stock or monetary
base, with its author noting that the St. Louis
equation “portrays a world in several respects
[that is] sharply at variance with the expectations
of most of us” (p. 121). Like DK, Davis reestimated
the AJ equation using different measures of mone-
tary policy, as well as different polynomial lag
specifications and different sample periods.
Davis’s analysis led him to conclude that “we can’t
accept the St. Louis equations at face value
because neither money nor the total reserve base
may be sufficiently exogenous” (p. 126). The only
recourse, he suggested, is to build a structural
model (like the FRB-MIT model) and reject the
reduced-form approach used by AJ. The onus for
monetarists, he implied, was to put their ideas
into a structural model that details the transmis-
sion mechanism of monetary policy. 
The controversy generated by the appearance
of AJ marked an abrupt change in the “monetary
versus fiscal policy” debate. Despite criticism of
the AJ study, the earlier view that business cycle
evidence relating money and income was “the
province of an obscure sect with headquarters in
Chicago” (Davis, 1969, p. 119) was changed by
their results. Monetary aggregates now were con-
sidered plausible alternatives to interest rates and
fiscal policy as tools for short-run economic stabi-
lization.
Darryl Francis and the Andersen-
Jordan Results
While the technical analysis, criticism, and
responses of the AJ equation took place in both
System and academic publications, its policy im-
plications were being disseminated in public
forums. Darryl Francis, the president of the St.
Louis Bank, used the AJ results to promote the role
22 Reviews include Meyer and Rasche (1980), Batten and Thornton
(1986), McCallum (1986), and Brunner (1986).
23 DeLeeuw, then a Senior Staff Member at the Urban Institute, had
been the Chief of the Special Studies Section, Division of Research
and Statistics at the Board of Governors and a principal in the
design and development of the FRB-MIT model. Kalchbrenner was
an economist in the Special Studies Section.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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of monetary aggregates in setting stabilization pol-
icy. Francis (1968, p. 8) rejected the use of fiscal
actions as a tool for stabilization, arguing that
“monetary actions are a major determinant of
short-run movements in total spending.” He also
rejected the common view that interest rates and
bank credit reflect accurately the stance of mone-
tary policy. Francis (1968) argued that “move-
ments in interest rates should be viewed no differ-
ently than movements in commodity prices” 
(p. 8). Instead, Francis pushed for the “primary
and consistent use of monetary aggregates” in set-
ting policy, noting that “all of these aggregates can
be rather precisely controlled by monetary
authorities” (p. 8). This approach would serve the
dual purpose of holding the authorities account-
able for their actions and instituting “scientific
methodology and modern quantitative analysis”
to monetary policy (p. 7).
At an FOMC meeting on February 4, 1969,
Francis reviewed how the Committee had been
misled by the behavior of interest rates and bank
credit:
For about four years  the Committee
had been led into unintended inflationary
monetary expansion while following
interest rate, net [free] reserves, and bank
credit objectives  If the Committee
meant business now, it should try some
other guides. Not only could the old
guides lead to further inflation as long as
demands for credit continued to rise, but
when and if contrary trends set in they
could lead to an undue contraction of
total spending.
Francis also made clear his preferred policy
guides: “He urged the Committee to give some evi-
dence that it was exercising restraint by limiting
the growth of bank reserves, the monetary base,
and the narrow measure of money supply” (FOMC
Minutes, February 4, 1969, p. 47).
Francis believed strongly that inflation was
the consequence of excessive monetary growth,
and that the Fed had erred in pursuing policies
that resulted in accelerating growth of the mone-
tary aggregates. In essence, Francis attacked the
dominant view that policy should be aimed at sta-
bilizing short-run variation in economic activity,
as reflected in the unemployment rate, at the
expense of higher inflation. At an FOMC meeting
on May 11, 1971, Francis reviewed the course of
monetary policy and inflation over the previous
20 years:
During the ten-year period ending in late
1962, money grew at an average annual
rate of 1.5 per cent  With the econom-
ic sluggishness of the early 1960’s 
monetary stimulation was increased, and
money rose at a 3.5 per cent average
annual rate from late 1962 to the end of
1966  [T]hat rate of monetary expan-
sion resulted in a gradual increase in
inflation to a 3 per cent rate. Following
the credit crunch of 1966 money growth
was again accelerated, producing a 6.3
per cent average annual rate from early
1967 to the present  [A] 6 per cent
trend rate of monetary expansion implied
a sustained 4 per cent rate of inflation. In
each case  the rate of growth in money
was accelerated in order to overcome
weakness in the economy. Despite those
progressively more stimulative monetary
actions, the rate of unemployment had
averaged about the same whether the
trend growth of money was 6 per cent,
3.5 per cent, or 1.5 per cent. The trend
growth had had its chief impact on prices,
whereas fluctuations around the trend
had had the greatest impact on produc-
tion and employment. (FOMC Minutes,
May 11, 1971, pp. 57-58)
Francis’s perspective reflected his monetarist
outlook: He argued that inflation is primarily
determined by the rate of growth of the money
stock and that, in the long run, real output growth
and the unemployment rate are unaffected by
monetary policy. In other words, the long run
Phillips curve is vertical.24 Francis also argued
that while monetary policy has no effect on real
growth or employment in the long run, fluctua-
tions in monetary growth could have substantial
effects on these variables in the short-run. He
used the Andersen and Jordan (1968) results, and
those of other Bank economists, to support his
claim.
24 The distinction between short- and long-run Phillips curves was for-
malized by Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967).12 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2001
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Although some members of the Committee
shared Francis’s views, the chairman and a majori-
ty of others did not. In one of the most frank dec-
larations of the opposing view, Chairman William
McChesney Martin stated at the October 7, 1969,
FOMC meeting that he “did not accept the mone-
tarist’s position regarding the critical importance
of the specific rate of change in the money supply.
In particular, he did not agree that the conse-
quences of deviating significantly from some pre-
ferred rate for a period of time would be as disas-
trous as the monetarists believed” (1969, p. 1100).
Board economists Gramley and Chase (1965, p.
1403) went even farther, arguing, “there is little
doubt that such a simple rule [based on changes
in the money stock] for appraisal of central bank
operations is no longer appropriate.”25
Francis cited Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
research often and at least once entered St. Louis
staff forecasts of real output and inflation under
alternative money stock growth rates into the for-
mal record of FOMC deliberations. His first record-
ed reference came at the December 17, 1968,
meeting when he discussed “a recent study done at
the St. Louis Reserve Bank [which] indicated that
with the existing stance of fiscal policy, if money
continued to grow at a 6 per cent annual rate
throughout the coming year, gross national prod-
uct would rise at an excessive 8 per cent annual
rate” (FOMC Minutes, December 17, 1968, p. 54).
Francis’s discussion illustrates that St. Louis
Fed officials (and monetarists in general) had
begun to actively engage the prevailing wisdom on
its own short-run grounds. The AJ results, in
effect, provided a platform by which monetarist
policy prescriptions, oriented to the behavior of
the monetary aggregates, could be discussed in
terms of short-run stabilization issues. With one
eye cocked to the longer-term inflationary effects
of policy, something that the conventional view
did not provide, monetarists could also discuss the
short-run effects of monetary policy.
Francis’s use in FOMC meetings of research
conducted by St. Louis Fed economists illustrates
how the Fed’s decentralized organizational struc-
ture can affect policy deliberations. The participa-
tion of Federal Reserve Bank presidents in mone-
tary policymaking provides an outlet for alterna-
tive perspectives to be heard, including direct criti-
cism of System policy. In addition to bringing the
research findings of his staff to FOMC delibera-
tions, Francis also promoted St. Louis Fed research
in his numerous public appearances. Citing “forth-
coming articles,” Francis often talked about lags in
the impact of monetary policy and how they
made attempts to “fine tune” a balance between
inflation and unemployment difficult, if not
impossible.26 Even so, the behavior of the econo-
my in the late 1960s gave credence to the claim
that nominal spending responded, albeit with a
lag, more to changes in money supply growth
than to fiscal policy. The “mini-recession” of 1966
and the failure of tax increases in 1968 to halt the
upward march of inflation seemed to support the
efficacy of monetary over fiscal policy. While
some of his FOMC colleagues had urged tighter
fiscal policy to stem inflation in 1968, and sup-
ported the temporary tax increase that had been
enacted, Francis contended that the tax increase
was unlikely to have a significant effect on eco-
nomic activity.27 As Francis predicted, the tempo-
rary fiscal measures adopted in 1968 had minimal
impact on economic activity. 
THE ST. LOUIS MODEL: MONETARISM
FOR THE SHORT-RUN
The predictive success of the St. Louis (AJ)
equation and the apparent failure of fiscal policy
to stem the inflation of the late 1960s gave mone-
tarists credibility in policy discussions. The behav-
ior of the money stock began to get more consid-
25 Gramley recalls the policy debates this way: “ if the Federal
Reserve had appreciated how serious the inflationary problem was
going to become, they would have paid more attention to the
growth of the monetary aggregates and relied less on money mar-
ket conditions  if you weren’t worried too much about long-run
inflation you were inclined therefore not to pay sufficient attention
to what was happening to those aggregates” (quoted in Mayer,
1995, pp. 7-8).
26 For example, at an FOMC meeting on March 9, 1971, he noted that
“In the past the System had, on occasion, persisted in a policy
course too long. Knowledge of current developments in the econo-
my was available only with a delay, and the effects of monetary
actions on spending, production, prices and employment contin-
ued for months” (FOMC Minutes, March 9, 1971, p. 66).
27 As Francis summarized his position before the FOMC, “Over the
past year the System had aggressively advocated fiscal restraint as a
necessity to rational stabilization policy. Yet now that such restraint
appeared likely, there seemed to be growing fear of its destabilizing
impact. [He] did not share those views  Those fiscal measures
were generally expected to be temporary, and thus much of the tax
burden on consumers would probably come from reduced saving
and much of the burden on corporations would probably come
from increased borrowing  The tax measure, because of its tem-
porary nature, might actually cause some acceleration of invest-
ment spending” (FOMC Minutes, June 18, 1968, pp. 87-88).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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eration in the setting of stabilization policy.28 But
some observers, even Homer Jones, the St. Louis
Bank’s research director when the St. Louis model
was developed, sounded a note of caution: 
Our own econometric studies at St. Louis
have long indicated strong, roughly pre-
dictable, relations between monetary action,
intentional or unintentional, and the course
of the economy  does this mean we can
expect to engage usefully in active monetary
management in the future?  I conclude
that we cannot in the near future engage intel-
ligently in short-run manipulative monetary
management. (1970, p.15, emphasis added)
Darryl Francis also warned against using mone-
tary policy to fine-tune economic activity. The
success of the AJ equation and the building empir-
ical evidence in support of monetarist views, how-
ever, led to a greater focus on the short-run. In his
retrospective of the equation’s development and
use, Jordan (1986, p. 8) notes that “The [AJ] arti-
cle’s impact on economic policymaking would
have been more favorable had it not led to an
increased reliance on monetary over fiscal policy,
but had it instead contributed to a general de-
emphasis of fine-tuning attempts by policymak-
ers.” 
The increasingly short-run emphasis undoubt-
edly reflected, in part, the natural focus of policy-
making at the central bank. Dewey Daane, a
Federal Reserve governor, noted that the FOMC
was “always concentrating on what’s the immedi-
ate problem over the next four to six weeks and
not really thinking in terms of long-run forecasts
and inflation” (quoted in Mayer, 1995, p. 16).
Governor Andrew Brimmer’s recollection corrobo-
rates this view, noting that there was “clearly a
short-term horizon. [Chairman] Martin put a lot of
emphasis on the long run, but that was unusual”
(quoted in Mayer, 1995, p. 4). 
In April 1970, the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis published “A Monetarist Model for
Economic Stabilization,” by Andersen and Carlson
(hereafter, AC). The AC, or “St. Louis” model as it
has become known, reflected the latest stage in
the development of an empirical model of mone-
tarist propositions and expanded the on-going
debate over the role of money in determining
aggregate spending and inflation in an important
way. Unlike the large-scale macroeconometric
models being developed elsewhere, the St. Louis
model built upon previous research at the Bank in
which the money stock is the central focus of sta-
bilization policy.
The original St. Louis model consisted of eight
equations, only four of which were estimated: the
total spending equation—the AJ equation, a price
equation, an equation for the long-term interest
rate, and an unemployment equation. The
remaining equations are definitions.29 The interest
rate equation, based on earlier work by Yohe and
Karnosky (1969), reflected the view that interest
rates are determined by past inflation and past
changes in money growth. The unemployment
equation was essentially that developed by Okun
(1962). The price equation rejected the typical
wage-price markup approach popular at the time.
Instead, AC specified the change in the price level
as a function of demand pressures and anticipated
price changes.
The St. Louis model is “monetarist” in that the
money stock is treated as exogenous and its effect
on total spending is central to the workings of the
model.30 As AC state:
The change in total spending is combined
with potential (full employment) output to
provide a measure of demand pressure.
Anticipated price change, which depends
on past price changes, is combined with
demand pressure to determine the change
in the price level. The total spending iden-
tity enables the change in output to be
determined, given the change in total
spending and the change in prices. (p.10)
28 In reviewing the discussion of monetary policy at a recent confer-
ence, Friedman wrote to Homer Jones in July 1969 that “I, too,
have been very much impressed with the evidence that a new day
has dawned  I almost fell over when he [Board Governor Dewey
Daane] started talking about the importance of paying attention to
monetary aggregates” (Friedman Papers, Box 28, Folder 36).
29 The original model is summarized in the Appendix. Carlson (1986)
provides a comparison of the original version and the then “cur-
rent” version which reflects modifications over the intervening
years.
30 AC determine real output as a residual; that is, output is deter-
mined as the difference between total spending and the price level.
As they note, “This method of determining the change in total
spending and its division between output change and price change
differs from most econometric models. A standard practice in
econometric model building is to determine output and prices sep-
arately, then combine them to determine total spending” (p.10).14 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2001
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The structure of the model meant that for a
given change in the money supply or government
expenditures, one could solve for changes in total
spending, prices, real output, the unemployment
rate, and interest rates. The model was simple in
comparison with the complex structural models
used by the Board staff and elsewhere. For exam-
ple, whereas the Wharton model, a representative
Keynesian structural model, had 43 exogenous
variables, the St. Louis model had just three. The
model also omitted details about specific sectors
for the simplicity of determining the impact of a
change in money growth on the economy broadly.
This development fit nicely with the view of many
monetarists that “the Federal Reserve should be
concerned with the aggregate effects of policy,
and should leave the allocative details to the oper-
ation of the market” (Francis 1973, p. 9).31 As
Carlson (1986, p. 18) recollects the development
of the model,
we wanted a model that was small enough
that the interrelationships among the varables
could be understood easily  We were not
concerned about respecifying behavioral
equations  [and] we wanted to capture
empirical relationships between a relatively
few key macroeconomic variables that were
implicitly grounded in economic theory. 
AC state explicitly that their statistical analysis
is used “to estimate the response of output and
prices to monetary and fiscal actions, not to test a
hypothesized structure” (pp. 10-11).32 The original
estimates appeared to support the monetarist view
of the world: an increase in the money supply
leads first to an immediate increase in nominal
spending and real output, and only after prices
adjust to the higher demand pressure does the
price level rise to stifle the increase in real output.
Using the Model for Short-Run
Analysis
Andersen and Carlson used the St. Louis
model to simulate nominal spending, real output,
inflation, and the unemployment rate for different
hypothesized growth paths for money. They also
compared their monetarist model’s forecasting
ability with that of the Wharton model during
1963-64, a period that included a major fiscal
action—the tax cut of 1964. How would the St.
Louis model, in which fiscal policy plays a minor
role, fare in comparison with the Wharton model
in which fiscal policy has a much larger role than
money? The St. Louis model’s simulations were
better (i.e., produced lower root-mean-squared
errors) than the Wharton model for nominal GNP
and the unemployment rate, about the same for
real GNP, and worse for the price level. The upshot
was that this small, monetarist-oriented model
could prove as valuable to policymakers as the
large-scale Keynesian models then in use.
Importantly, it seemed to demonstrate the useful-
ness of a small monetarist model for current
analysis. As AC state, “The purpose of the follow-
ing statistical section is to estimate the response of
output and prices to monetary and fiscal actions,
not to test a hypothesized structure. The focus is
on the response in the short run—periods of two or
three years—but the long-run properties also are
examined” (1970, pp. 10-11, emphasis added). 
The success of the St. Louis model was impor-
tant to monetarism’s growing impact on policy
discussions. It also appeared soon after Friedman
(1968) and Phelps (1967) provided theoretical
models in which the popular Phillips curve trade-
off between inflation and unemployment (and,
hence, real output growth) was shown to be transi-
tory. The Phillips curve, a version of which
appears in the St. Louis model, was a critical com-
ponent of most Keynesian macro-models of the
time. The results of AC provided an empirical
demonstration that although expansionary mone-
tary policy might produce a short-run increase in
real output growth and a dip in the unemploy-
ment rate, these effects would vanish over time as
inflation increased and unemployment and output
growth returned to their “natural” or trend rates.
The St. Louis model enabled monetarists to
produce short-run forecasts of alternative policy
scenarios, thereby putting them on similar footing
31 A recurrent theme in discussions about the role of policy was the
recognition that policy actions sometimes affected certain indus-
tries—most notably housing—more than others. Such attention
was disruptive to the working of market forces, Francis believed. He
noted that “Regulation of interest rates paid by commercial banks
and thrift institutions unduly disrupts the allocation function of
markets. Furthermore, excessive concern for the well-being of
these institutions and the housing industry has caused monetary
authorities to expand the money stock at a rapid rate during much
of the current inflationary period” (1968, p. 9).
32 Francis (1973, p. 8) makes the point that “The bewildering strug-
gles that occur between model builders over specification errors,
structural versus reduced-form models, recursive versus non-recur-
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with other mainstream economists, both in and
outside of the Federal Reserve System. Dewald
(1988, p. 6) contends that with the development of
the St. Louis model, “monetarism was widely inter-
preted as providing an alternative to short-run
Keynesian model forecasts.” The St. Louis model,
though grounded in the long-run conditions of the
Quantity Theory, increasingly was used to counter
the short-run policy prescriptions coming from
the larger structural models in use at the Board.
The St. Louis model, estimated using quarterly
observations and with the money stock—not
interest rates—as the policy instrument, led many
observers to conclude that the money stock could
be an effective tool for economic stabilization.
The shifting emphasis at the St. Louis Bank
toward short-run policy analysis can be found in
comments of participants in the model’s develop-
ment. Carlson (1972, p. 25) warned against using
the model for anything but interpreting the “gen-
eral time path” of important macroeconomic vari-
ables. Even so, analysis of the short-run impact of
alternative policies is precisely what the model
came to be used for. His own admonition aside,
Carlson (1972, p. 20) noted that the model “pres-
ents a set of simulations using alternative steady
growth rates which can aid in assessing the eco-
nomic impact over several quarters of different
trend growth rates of money” (emphasis added).
In keeping with this view, his analysis of the
model’s performance was based on a six-quarter
horizon, hardly the long run used by early mone-
tarist studies. But such a use for the model
appeared justified by the empirical results: “the
model succeeded in roughing out the average time
paths of total spending, real product, prices,
unemployment, and interest rates during the peri-
od from late 1969 to mid-1971” (Carlson, 1972, p.
26, emphasis added).
The model’s success as a forecast tool gave
support to monetarist calls for a policy aimed at
stable money growth. In reviewing the debate over
stabilization policy, Andersen (1973, p. 3) summa-
rized the model’s success at forecasting real output
and inflation, stating that “The key proposition is
that changes in money dominate other short-run
influences on output and other long-run influences
on the price level and nominal aggregate demand”
(emphasis added). The St. Louis model suggested
that stable money growth would lessen any
monetary-induced instability in the real economy
while promoting price stability in the long run.
Research from St. Louis continued to provide a
long-term, inflation-oriented perspective on mon-
etary policy actions, reflecting rising inflation of
the early 1970s. At the same time, the Review con-
tained numerous studies, often authored by
Andersen or Keran, of the short-run response of
the economy to changes in the growth of the
monetary aggregates. The allure of short-run
analysis perhaps is best illustrated by Carlson’s
(1975) estimation of the St. Louis equation using
monthly data. Replacing nominal GNP with per-
sonal income, Carlson found that the lag from
changes in the growth of money to nominal
income was completed in about one year, similar
to that found by AJ, though slower than reported
in other studies.33 The implication of this finding
was clear: Carlson (1975, p. 17) suggests that the
“Use of monthly data thus appears to carry the
potential for evaluating the thrust of monetary
and fiscal actions before quarterly data on GNP
become available.”
In the late 1960s, public interest in mone-
tarism rose as inflation continued to increase.
Monetarists were called upon by the incoming
Nixon administration for advice. Milton Friedman
wrote a regular column for Newsweek alongside
one by Paul Samuelson, who had been a leading
advisor to the previous two administrations and a
leading architect of the so-called New Economics.
Increased attention, however, brought more stri-
dent criticism. By 1972 there already were claims
that monetarism had “failed.” For example, in his
Newsweek column of August 2, 1971, Samuelson
objected to the monetarist claim that rapid money
growth in 1971 would subsequently lead to faster
nominal GNP growth. He suggested that “the fore-
casting ability of monetarism is selling at a huge
discount on the markets of informed opinion”
(Samuelson 1971, p. 70) and that the “pseudoposi-
tivism which prevails among monetarists. . . [is]
still another reason why the peculiar tenets of
monetarism have to be rejected” (quoted in
Francis, 1972, p. 32).
Members of the Board of Governors also criti-
cized the policy advice of monetarists. For exam-
ple, Andrew Brimmer, echoing arguments made
during the previous two decades, rejected any pol-
icy based on control of the monetary aggregates:
“I am convinced that it would be a disastrous
33 Another example of attempts to model the short-run effects of
money on the economy is Laffer and Ransom (1971). Unlike the St.
Louis results, Laffer and Ransom report that monetary actions lead
to an immediate and permanent effect on the level of GNP.16 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2001
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error for the Federal Reserve to try to conduct
monetary policy on the basis of a few simple rules
governing the rate of expansion of the money
supply” (1972, p. 351). 
Francis (1972, p. 32) considered such attacks
“strident,” “doctrinaire,” and “no more precise
than in the past.” He answered these criticisms by
pointing to the St. Louis model’s ability to forecast
economic activity over the short-run. He com-
pared income, inflation, and unemployment pre-
dictions for 1969, 1970, and 1971 derived from
the St. Louis model to those of the consensus
Livingston forecasts. The overall forecasting ability
of the St. Louis model compared favorably with
the consensus forecasts. Although Francis main-
tained that policy should take a longer-term view
to be effective, he focused on a few years of fore-
casting results to justify applying the model to
shorter time horizons.
Refining the Model
As the 1970s progressed, neither Keynesian
models based on the Phillips curve and interest
rates, nor simple monetarist models based on
growth of the money stock, successfully forecast
the rapid inflation and higher unemployment that
actually occurred. Monetarists faced the task of
explaining why inflation had increased so dramat-
ically without a similar-sized increase in money
stock growth. Monetarists, including St. Louis Fed
officials, responded that their critics had confused
changes in the aggregate price level, which are
caused by monetary policy, with changes in rela-
tive prices brought on by special factors. Francis
presented the Bank’s position in a series of
speeches in 1974. He pointed out that the increase
in inflation was due largely to an increase in
money growth over the preceding few years. Any
inflation over and above the underlying monetary
growth rate was caused by the removal of wage
and price controls and the increase in oil prices by
the OPEC nations.34
St. Louis Fed economists soon integrated such
special factors in their studies. Karnosky (1976)
demonstrated that money growth continued to
explain longer-term movements of inflation once
the oil price shock effects were accounted for.
Rasche and Tatom (1977) extended this idea in
their examination of the effects of supply shocks
on the economy and how they could distort the
statistical relationship between money and
income in the short-run. Although aspects of
these works were criticized, they suggested that
the money supply remained useful for stabiliza-
tion purposes.
The Breakdown of the Monetarist Rule
Kane (1990) observes that as the rate of inflation
continued to increase over the 1970s, the growing
weight of evidence supporting the monetarist posi-
tion pushed the FOMC to incorporate money stock
growth into their policy deliberations and evalua-
tions. This was quite a change from their position of
a decade earlier when “they treated monetarism as
an eccentric and quasi-religious belief system that
no responsible macroeconomist or public official
could possibly take seriously”(p. 292).
Monetarism as a policy approach, however,
had a relatively short stay in the limelight. In
October 1979, the Federal Reserve adopted new
operating procedures that it claimed would
enhance its control of the money stock. Highly
restrictive policies also were enacted to reduce
inflation, which had reached double-digit levels.
Although inflation eventually declined significant-
ly, the more immediate effect was to send the
economy into the deepest recession of the post-
war period. Critics associated the policy with
monetarism, referring to the policy as the Fed’s
“monetarist experiment,” and this perception con-
tributed to the widespread discounting of mone-
tarism as a viable policy option. Monetarists
protested that the Fed had not, in fact, adopted
their preferred policy of slow and steady money
growth. Rather, they noted, the variability of
money growth actually increased after 1979 and
gave rise to increased fluctuations in real econom-
ic activity without any appreciable short-run effect
on inflation.35
34 Francis argued similarly in FOMC deliberations. At a meeting on
January 22, 1974, for example, Francis contended that “the actual
and prospective slowdown in economic activity resulted wholly
from capacity, supply, and price-distorting constraints and not from
a weakening in demand. Therefore, to ease [monetary] policy and
allow a faster rate of monetary growth would be to increase infla-
tionary pressures without expanding real output or reducing unem-
ployment” (FOMC Minutes, January 22, 1974, p. 102).
35 Batten and Stone (1983) provide an overview of the issues and evi-
dence in support of the monetarist position. For contrasting assess-
ments of this episode, see B. Friedman (1984) and M. Friedman
(1984). Charles Schultz, Chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisors from 1977-81, considered the monetarist experiment in
this light: “What monetarism really is for the Fed (and I’m morally
certain this is what Volcker thinks, too) a political cover.  They’re
not monetarists, but it allowed them to do what they could never
have done  They could never have done what needed to be
done if it looked as if they were the ones raising interest rates,
when they were targeting interest rates, per se.  But with fixed
monetary targets they could just say, ‘Who, us?’” (quoted in
Hargrove and Morely, 1984, p. 486).Regardless of whether the Fed had in fact
adopted a monetarist policy in 1979, large, volatile
movements in velocity began to erode profession-
al support for monetarist policies. Inflation and
attendant increases in market interest rates
encouraged financial innovations that gave con-
sumers more options for holding liquid balances.
This, in turn, spurred regulatory changes that pro-
duced sharp changes in the relative demands for
liquid financial assets. At the same time, the Fed’s
abrupt tightening brought a sharp decline in the
rate of inflation, which probably contributed to a
reversal of the upward trend in velocity that had
characterized the previous three decades.36 Asset
demand shifts and uncertainty about the Fed’s
commitment to a new path for inflation probably
explain why the velocity of traditional measures
of the money stock, especially the narrow meas-
ures, such as M1, favored by officials of the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, began to move
erratically. Stable velocity was crucial for the
reduced-form models used at St. Louis to hold. If
the path of velocity changed unpredictably, then
the predictions of the St. Louis equation and
model could be unreliable.37 As velocity began to
deviate seriously and continuously from its previ-
ously stable path, monetarist policy prescriptions
became increasingly suspect. 
As shown in Figure 1, the velocity of M1—the
monetary aggregate used in the St. Louis model—
maintained a fairly steady upward climb during
the 1960s and 1970s. During the 1980s, however,
M1 velocity deviated considerably from its previ-
ous path. M1 velocity appeared to become “unsta-
ble,” thus justifying critics’ opposition to monetary
targeting.38
As M1 velocity deviated further from its his-
toric trend, St. Louis Fed researchers devoted
increasing effort to understanding velocity and
modifying their forecasting model. Meyer and
Varvares (1981), for example, made two modifica-
tions: one modification was to model the rate of
inflation as a direct outcome of money growth
and oil price shocks; the other modification incor-
porated a new Phillips curve relation. Other St.
Louis Fed studies researched the lag between
money and prices (Carlson, 1980), the effects of
fiscal policy (Hafer, 1982), and the longer-run
consequences of policy (Carlson and Hein, 1983).
These studies all concluded that the reduced-form
approach continued to be a reasonable way of
modeling the impact of monetary policy on the
economy, and early success at improving model
forecasts encouraged further research along the
same lines. But, because the shift in velocity had
occurred only recently, and therefore affected
only a limited number of observations used in the
estimation of the model, these papers largely
ignored the potential effects of the shift. Indeed,
even Carlson’s (1986) version of the model, one
that made minor revisions that recognized the
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36 Gavin and Dewald (1989) show that disinflation leads to a reduc-
tion in velocity once the public comes to expect that a new trend
growth rate of money and the price level have been established.
37 This potential problem was already known. For example, Rasche
(1972) noted that the successful forecasting ability of the St. Louis
equation was, in part, based on the small interest elasticity of the
money demand function. As he states (p. 31): “if the short-run
interest elasticity of the money demand function is very small,
then an estimated equation omitting this term [the interest rate]
would most likely produce a credible forecasting record” (emphasis
in original). In some sense, the constant term in equation (1) is the
empirical representation of velocity. Financial innovations altered
the underlying short-run interest elasticity of money demand and
adversely affected the equation’s forecasting ability. Because no
changes along these lines were made to the model, its forecasts
began to stray. More recent investigations of the behavior of veloci-
ty include Stone and Thornton (1987), Rasche (1993), Hoffman and
Rasche (1996), and Laurent (1999).
38 Monetarists had long divided over whether a narrow aggregate,
such as the monetary base or M1, or a broader aggregate, such as
M2 or M3, was a preferable target for monetary policy. St. Louis
Fed officials advocated M1, while Milton Friedman favored M2.
When M1 velocity began to deviate from its trend in the early
1980s, M2 velocity remained relatively stable. By the early 1990s,
however, M2 velocity also had deviated substantially from its long-
run trend.
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impact of energy prices, wage and price controls,
and several other technical changes, continued to
fit the data reasonably well. Thus, for a time, mon-
etarists continued to argue that nominal income
growth reflected changes in money growth over
short periods and that inflation reflected money
growth over longer periods, even during this
turbulent time. As the 1980s progressed, however,
continued instability of velocity caused all but the
most diehard supporters to abandon short-run
monetary aggregate targets. 
LESSONS FROM THE ST. LOUIS
EXPERIENCE
The development and decline of the St. Louis
monetarist model as a guide to short-run stabiliza-
tion policy is not unlike the evolution of stabiliza-
tion policies designed to exploit a tradeoff
between inflation and unemployment. Policies
based on the Phillips curve arose from an appar-
ently robust empirical relationship between infla-
tion and unemployment observed in macroeco-
nomic data. As discussed in King and Watson
(1994), the negative correlation between the vari-
ables in the short-run suggested the presence of a
long-run structural relationship that could be
exploited for policy purposes. Attempts to manip-
ulate interest rates to increase the growth of real
output and employment above potential, however,
gave rise to what has been called “the great infla-
tion” in the United States, a period encompassing
the 1960s and 1970s.39 
Over the 1970s, as inflation and unemploy-
ment rose simultaneously, monetarists gained a
stronger voice in monetary policy debates as the
long-run relations among money, prices, and
nominal income seemed to hold even in the
short-run. Due in part to work at the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Woodford (forthcoming,
p. 18) suggests that “the monetarist viewpoint had
become the new orthodoxy by the mid-1970s.” 
The St. Louis Bank and its officials had special
prominence because they provided an avenue for
monetarist research and views to potentially
influence policy deliberations. To be influential,
however, monetarists had to offer a viable policy
for the short-run—a policy that could be discussed
and voted on at meetings some six weeks apart.
The success of the St. Louis model at forecasting
output, nominal income, and prices over such
short horizons during the 1970s convinced St.
Louis Fed officials that they could credibly advocate
a monetarist stabilization policy for the short-run.
The Federal Reserve took a step toward mone-
tary aggregate targeting in October 1979, when
new procedures were implemented to better con-
trol the money stock with the goal of reducing
inflation. The targeting of monetary aggregates was
largely abandoned in 1982, however, when velocity,
particularly of M1—the narrow aggregate favored
by St. Louis Fed officials—proved too erratic.
Deregulation, other institutional changes, and
uncertainty about the Fed’s commitment to disin-
flation probably explain much of the unstable
behavior of velocity in the 1980s. The Depository
Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
of 1980 (DIDMCA) instituted a six-year process
ending the prohibition of interest payments on
transaction accounts at commercial banks and
deregulating rates on other accounts. These
changes, and various financial innovations, were
followed by volatile flows between classes of
financial assets that altered the empirical relation-
ships between national income and monetary
aggregates. Monetary aggregates quickly lost favor
as short-run policy targets when movements in
velocity became difficult to explain or predict. In
essence, changes in the structure of the economy
altered the short-run relationships between tradi-
tional monetary aggregates and policy objectives.
Monetarist models, including the St. Louis model,
were not equipped to handle such changes, and
their forecasting performance suffered as a result.
Typical macroeconomic models of the 1970s,
including the St. Louis model, also were not
equipped to deal with the so-called “Lucas
Critique.” Lucas (1976) demonstrated that coeffi-
cient estimates of typical forecasting models are
unlikely to be stable across policy regimes. As
individuals learn about and modify their behavior
in response to a change in regime, empirical rela-
tionships among macroeconomic variables may
change. Consequently, economic projections
based on estimation of a model over one regime
may not be valid for a different regime. For exam-
ple, the close short-run correlations among
money, output, and prices observed during the
1960s and 1970s under a regime characterized by
interest rate targeting would not necessarily have
been so close in a regime of monetary aggregate
39 For alternative views of this period, see DeLong (1997), Mayer
(1999), Sargent (1999), Taylor (1999), or Wheelock (1998).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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targeting.40
The search for robust empirical relationships
across different regimes has shown that money,
nominal income, and inflation remain closely
linked in the long run (Dewald, 1998; Dwyer and
Hafer, 1999; Lucas, 1996; Rolnick and Weber,
1997). There also is some evidence that the link-
ages between money and economic activity are
robust even at relatively short-run frequencies.41
Monetary aggregates again may prove useful for
economic forecasting or as guides for conducting
monetary policy. Experience has shown, however,
that empirical relationships between policy vari-
ables and goals can change, sometimes unpre-
dictably. The experience with the monetarist rule
as developed at the St. Louis Fed councils against
overconfidence in our ability to identify infallible
rules for conducting short-run stabilization policy.
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A
The first version of the St. Louis monetarist
model appeared in Andersen and Carlson (1970),
Exhibit 1. It is summarized below. For a compari-
son of the original and last versions of the
model, see Carlson (1986).
Exogenous Variables:
∆ Mt = change in money stock





∆ Yt =change in total spending (nominal GNP)
∆ Pt = change in price level (GNP deflator)
Dt= demand pressure
∆ Xt = change in output (real GNP)
Rt = market interest rate
∆ Pt
A = anticipated change in price level
Ut= unemployment rate
Gt = GNP gap 
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